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631 625 responsible only to the Czar; and the police, not being responsible to the public, but only to their immediate superiors, tended to be arbitrary.

647 What mattered in Russia's bureaucratic system was obedience to one's superiors. That was the primary criterion of judgment of the fitness of a civil servant, not his ability or personal integrity. Seldom was an employee dismissed because of corruption and injustice. A functionary could not be prosecuted for acts committed in the exercise of his functions except with the consent, or, on the initiative of his superiors. And the higher placed the offender, the less real was his responsibility. At the same time a subordinate employee, a soldier, or an inferior officer had no redress if wronged by his superior. A subordinate did have the right by law to lodge a complaint against mistreatment on the part of his chief, but according to the rules of Russian hierarchical discipline, no public servant, civil or military, could present a petition or complaint except through his own superior officer.[5] Few ever dared to do so.

647 871 This bureaucratic irresponsibility and impunity assumes an especial significance if one has in mind the low status of education and training of Russian officials. By the end of the nineteenth century in the provinces, according to an official investigation, out of a hundred employees, only one or two were found to have attended a university, five or six to have graduated from secondary schools, ten or twelve from primary schools. Eighty out of a hundred had had no formal schooling whatever and had passed no examination.[6] Many former soldiers and war veterans with little or no formal schooling crowded civil administration. At times the higher the education the less chances one had to enter state service.[7]

II

647 557 In such a system excess in zeal was often rewarded. On the other hand, initiative and originality, if not successful, were fraught with great personal risks. Therefore, shirking from work and responsibility, and struggling for office and rank became the rule. It was only by achieving higher position and by winning

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the favors of one's superiors that one hoped to exercise more power and to achieve a higher degree of security.

Such a situation often demanded self-abasing and cringing humility toward superiors in the hierarchy as an adjustment to a situation of permanent insecurity and threat. ". . . those employed believe that they can never do enough to show their zeal."[8] "Without being base, it is impossible to get on," the officials themselves would say.[9] At the same time, perhaps as a compensation for degradation and loss of self-respect, there developed the propensity of the officials to show haughtiness and arrogance to those below them in rank and status. "A man, as soon as he rises a grade above the common level, acquires the right . . . to maltreat his inferiors to whom it is his duty to transmit the blows that he receives from those above him."[10]

In such conditions preoccupation with one's self rather than interest in group ideals and objectives thrived. There was therefore a tendency for selfish and petty concerns, greediness, venality, and corruption. Careerism prevailed over loyalty. Fortunes were made by many in public service as a security for the uncertain future.[11] The public opinion itself supported such behavior because it was expected that people who acquire office or any other positions of trust would take personal advantage of the situation. In some departments because of the inadequacy of the salaries and in order to meet the expected high standards of living the officials were considered to have tacit permission to have recourse to illicit perquisites. Administration, justice, police, the army and the navy, and even the clergy, all had their acknowledged perquisites, which often included bribes.[12]

In such conditions in which extreme self-concern thrived, the Czar himself did not feel safe and secure. This sense of insecurity on the very peak of power was reflected, for instance, in the tendency of the Czars not to tolerate any outstanding personalities in their midst.[13] The same feeling was reflected in the idea that any concession on the part of the Czar would be considered as a sign of weakness. The result was that the Czar was often surrounded by sycophants and careerists and had no close friends whom he could trust and on whom he could rely for support at all times. In such circumstances the Czar might feel isolated,

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much possibility for self-expression, creativeness and personal satisfaction.[24]

On the other hand an atmosphere of domineering and vigilantism offers a great opportunity for advance to the fanatic Party member as well as to the ambitious and unscrupulous careerist within the labor ranks, and the ranks of technicians and engineers. Even among those managers and foremen who might otherwise have different inclinations, the need to maintain their positions often forces them towards a policy of vigilantism, cynicism and oppressive labor driving.

22
INSTRUMENTS OF POLITICAL CONFORMITY

I

THE SYSTEM of dominance, based on economic dependence, social isolation and lack of trust, which has enabled the Bolsheviks to monopolize all social power, has helped them also to force the intellectual strata into unconditional submission to the will of the ruling minority. Just as the land has been collectivized and industrial production governmentalized to make the peasants and the industrial labor dependent upon the Party, so all sources of income in the intellectual fields have been monopolized by the Party-state to make the intellectuals completely dependent for their lives and livelihoods upon the ruling faction of the Bolsheviks. The office tenure of this new service nobility has been conditioned upon their blind submission to the rulers in the Kremlin, just like in the days of the old dvorianstvo.

The educated strata are of a special strategic importance from the point of view of self-perpetuation of the Bolsheviks in power, because it is these strata that provide ideological and political leadership and Party cadres. The party has endeavored therefore to make the intelligentsia even more socially split and dependent

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upon the regime than the peasantry and industrial labor. The objective of this policy has been to prevent among the intelligentsia formation of an *esprit de corps* and opposition to Bolshevik rule, and to command the services and unquestionable obedience of every educated man. These are the political foundations of the growing and deliberately fostered stress on rank and distinction, on social differentiation, sense of superiority and inferiority, absolute superordination and blind subordination.

In the upper strata, much more so than in the lower classes, the process of hierarchal and functional differentiation is fostered and maintained not only by means of specialization of work and differences in rank, but also by means of sharply differentiated income, and by means of differential distribution of spoils, and of privileges. This sharp stratification of Soviet society, rooted in the traditions of the Czardom, in its own turn promotes power-seeking and domineering, dependency and subservience, as well as lack of social intimacy and lack of trust.

The highest privileges in the Soviet society are accruing to the top ruling faction of professional conspirators. But this group is itself internally sharply differentiated. It is headed by the Party Leader (*Vozhd*), and is divided into a number of policy making bodies, among which the Political Bureau (Politburo), now to be known as the Presidium,[1] is of foremost importance. Though the members of the Presidium and of other top policy making bodies, such as the Secretariat, are formally appointed by the Central Committee of the Party, they are *de facto* selected by the supreme leader and therefore depend upon him for their position. Such a situation fosters bickering among top ranking officials in their mutual struggle to win the favors of the head man, which in turn enables the supreme Party leader to play one faction of his camarilla against the other one or—not unlike in the days of the Czars—to select a more intimate inner circle of a few most trusted persons on whom to rely for advice and help. These then assist the leader in selecting and in eliminating the members of the top ranking hierarchy, according to expediency and circumstances.

This highly concentrated power structure is supported by a

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those accounts of Soviet life in which the gloomy appearance of the city populace is contrasted to the more optimistic outlook of the country folk.[34]

25
DESTRUCTIVE AGGRESSION

I

PROMPTED by extreme power-seeking and by deeply rooted mistrust of their own subjects, the Bolsheviks have built a monolithic Party-state system which differs in the degree of its rigidity and power concentration from all other systems of despotism, theocracy, military dictatorship, totalitarian and police state. In those autocratic political systems not all aspects of life are regimented. A certain limited degree of freedom is left at least in some spheres of personal and of group behavior. But the main difference between these systems and the Bolshevik regime is that while the former prohibits only those activities which have a direct negative bearing upon perpetuation of the system, the latter allows only such behavior as has a direct positive bearing upon the perpetuation of the ruling faction in power.

In the Soviet society the ruling class is not content with mere passive acceptance of the Bolshevik rule. It demands of each subject a "positive attitude" toward the regime. In such a society there is necessarily a premium in terms of privileges and power for the activities in the fields of political organization and agitation, of vigilance and violence, as well as in the fields of labor-driving, economic management, and military preparedness, since it is in the main upon such activities that perpetuation of Bolshevism depends. In such a "prison and barracks society", it is the calculating and ambitious careerists and zealous devotees and watchdogs, specialists in conspiracy and violence who climb toward the top levels of the Soviet political and social pyramid where blind obedience, crouching servility, jockeying for positions and power, and advancing on the cadavers of one's associates become a matter of survival.

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Many observers of Soviet society have noticed that in this constant struggle for power, and sometimes in order to save their very lives, Soviet officials and intellectuals must be ready not only to inform on each other, but also to "throw mud" at the closest associates and friends as soon as these happen to fall in disgrace.[1] Denunciation of a friend is often "the best way out of a hole," they say. Many "pretend to deny and to disown those who fall in disgrace" or, frightened, "join in verbal lynching to protect themselves." There is a "malignant joy regarding a comrade's mistakes . . . exaggeration of mistakes."[2] They "rush to kick a man who is already down, to push him over the precipice." In such conditions "Friendship is strained with blood and betrayal; it is an object of fear and suspicion."[3] Even members of one's own family might be repudiated under such pressure.[4] At the same time the need for cringing before one's superiors is often compensated by arrogance, capriciousness, arbitrariness, insulting and humiliating treatment of his subordinates or of all unprotected.[5]

The sense of guilt, insecurity, and feelings of humiliation which develop in such circumstances are magnified by means of social isolation. This isolation is manifold in the Soviet society, especially in the upper ruling strata. Intimate personal contact and unfettered social and intellectual intercourse is officially frowned upon and is therefore very limited among the Party, Army, government and managerial hierarchies. Intimate fraternization with associates is looked upon with great suspicion in a society whose ruling minority maintains itself in power by means of planned social divisions and mistrusts. Said Stalin: ". . . such family conditions create a favorable environment for the nurture of reptiles, not Bolsheviks."[6]

Real risks are involved in any free discourse in a society which is infested with watchdogs and informers and in which many are inclined to seek self-advance in the ruin of others. In the upper strata besides fear, suspicion and need for extreme caution, there is lack of intimate contact also because of sharp differentiation in rank. For the same reasons intercourse between the educated and non-educated strata has to be kept to a minimum.

There is also a deliberate policy on the part of the ruling class

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517 newspapers, books, and pamphlets, some of which were printed
204 abroad and circulated freely though often clandestinely among
626 the leading circles of the Empire.

517 The ruling circles of the Bolshevik Party themselves were
626 always aware that without criticism intellectual stagnation, lack of creative initiative, and bureaucratism would set in. But they could not afford to allow complete freedom of thought and of expression which might eventually undermine their own power. As a result the Bolsheviks introduced a system of "criticism and self-criticism," known as *samokritika.*

[461] According to this practice it is the duty of every Soviet subject to criticize his own work and the work of others in his shop or office as a means of stimulating alertness, initiative, and hard
● [557] work, and as a way to correct errors. But among the officials who
[647] closely watch each other's activities, each hoping to rise on the cadaver of the other, samokritika is often used as a means of intrigue and ruin in jockeying and struggling for ranks, positions, and power. Samokritika therefore has developed into a weapon employed to detect the ideological deviations and diversions and to criticize any lack of sufficiently positive attitude toward the "Party line." In this manner "self-criticism" in the Soviet Union has become another instrument of regimentation and means to increase conformity.

626 Samokritika is also employed by the ruling circles to manipu-
661 late hostilities generated by the Soviet system and to direct them away from themselves and against the managers and bureaucrats located mostly on the lower levels of the Soviet social pyramid. These people conveniently function as scapegoats. It is such people who, together with a sprinkling from the higher echelons, are periodically offered as sacrifice and "purged" or "liquidated." Samokritika is therefore employed also as a check against abuses of power, though mostly on the local level.

626 In an atmosphere of complete dependence upon and subordi-
154 nation to an overwhelming and infallible power which instils
782 fear and awe, the slightest deviation from the line of thought and emotions as laid down by that distant and inscrutable force might easily provoke anxieties, and a strong sense of guilt. In circumstances in which one feels isolated and without support,

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vising, checking and controlling. Accordingly just as in the Soviet Union in each satellite country primary attention is paid to the personnel policies. "Department of Cadres" and "Personnel Bureaus," headed by people who are trusted friends of the Soviet Union and advised by Soviet experts, supervise the political reliability and the labor efficiency of all. Observers of these agencies and Soviet experts are at work in every Party organization, every office and every factory shop. The hiring, releasing, and transferring of personnel rests with these bureaus.

In all these considerations political reliability and not professional competence is of foremost importance, a situation that favors the rise of professionally incompetent zealots and careerists ahead of people who are professionally able but more cautious and moderate, or more independent.[44] In consequence, just as in the Soviet Union, there is a keen struggle for positions and ranks and there is a premium on specialists in political organization and violence, a great demand for watchdogs, agitators, overseers and labor-drivers. Unconditional faith in and devotion to Russia is considered, however, to be the first and primary prerequisite for advance in satellite political, military and managerial hierarchies.[45] Hence periodical purges or "verifications" of Party members are undertaken to insure that only sufficiently Russified people remain in the Party.

The need of total control of dependencies dictates also a divide and rule policy among the satellites. In accordance with such policies the Kremlin instigates and encourages local nationalisms, regionalisms and separatisms and external aggressiveness of the satellites while at the same time it must prevent pan-movements and excessive territorial ambitions which might challenge the dominance of Moscow. Thus while instigating Asiatic nationalism the Soviet Union must prevent the championship of the Pan-Mongolian idea by Mongolia or Communist China. While encouraging various Balkan nationalisms it had to prevent the formation of a South Slav Federation.

Another means of promoting effective control of and dominance of the satellites is isolating these vassal countries from the West and therefore preventing any Western influence to undermine Bolshevik rule. This aim is achieved by deliberately pro-